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“EAT YOUR SPINACH?” 
STEPHEN GILLERS* 
Pedagogy being biography (to amend Thomas Carlyle1), I begin with some 
facts of life.  After law school and a clerkship, I practiced law for nine years in 
New York City.  I did this in various settings; first, with a large firm, and then 
at a small civil liberties organization.  And then I didn’t know what to do with 
myself.  I interviewed at big and small firms, but they didn’t interest me as the 
partners who interviewed me surely realized.  It was 1972; I was 28 years old 
and still living in the 1960s.  I didn’t want a boss.  One day, I walked past a 
tailor shop on the lower east side of Manhattan.  Today, the neighborhood is 
called Noho and has two-million dollar condos and restaurants that feature 
seven varieties of exotic salad, but then it was home to rent-controlled 
tenements and ethnic restaurants, mostly Polish and Jewish.  I knew it was a 
tailor shop because “TAILOR” was stenciled on the plate-glass window and 
because inside sat an elderly man hunched over a sewing machine.  A dozen 
garments hung on a rod beside him. And nothing more. 
Right then, I had my epiphany.  A lawyer could do what a tailor could do.  
What mattered was the person.  I didn’t need to work at a law firm to be a 
lawyer.  I was one already.  My education and few years of experience were 
more than adequate.  I had knowledge that people would pay me for.  This was 
instantly liberating.  I would open a lawyer shop, although not in a storefront 
with “LAWYER” stenciled on the window.  Instead, a few months later, I 
rented a room in someone else’s small office in lower Manhattan.  The 
building had a bank and a coffee shop on the main floor and a copy shop next 
door, which was pretty much all the retail I ever expected to need in practice.  
My room had a picture window with a view of the Hudson River.  It was 
cheap, too.  Today the neighborhood is called Tribeca and has three-million 
dollar condos and a Pan-Asian restaurant on every other block.  I bought a used 
desk, a few chairs, a ficus benjamina, stationery, and a portable typewriter (this 
was BC, before computers).  I had no books.  I used a bar association library 
three blocks away. 
 
* Emily Kempin Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. 
 1. Thomas Carlyle wrote that the “history of the world is but the biography of great men,” a 
questionable proposition.  THOMAS CARLYLE, ON HEROES, HERO-WORSHIP, AND THE HEROIC IN 
HISTORY 26 (1859). 
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I practiced this way for more than two years.  I earned more each month 
than ever before. With the overconfidence of a young person, I accepted all 
kinds of matters.  I figured if I worked hard and treated my clients with respect 
and concern, I would survive, even succeed.  That was quite a leap of faith, as I 
recognize today, but then I felt it as a certainty.  Luckily, it turned out to be 
true.  Like all converts, I was fervent about what I was doing and set out to 
persuade others.  I interviewed fifty lawyers who had started their own practice 
and then wrote a book, “I’d Rather Do It Myself:” How to Set Up Your Own 
Law Firm.2  It’s still in print.  Its financial information is dated but the 
psychological truths remain current. 
After two years and three months, my firm doubled.  I joined with my 
friend Ken, who was also in practice alone, and we rented office space on the 
fifty-fifth floor of a Fifth Avenue office building.  My office had a clear view 
of the Empire State and Chrysler Buildings.  The neighborhood was upscale 
and our expenses multiplied, but the basic idea did not change.  What made a 
lawyer good was not the office or technology.  If you worked hard and treated 
clients with concern and respect, you didn’t need much more.  If not, you 
wouldn’t last long.3  Our biggest case, an admiralty litigation in federal court, 
is Exhibit A.  On the eve of trial, the client’s prior law firm, an admiralty firm, 
advised that the case was a sure loser and should be settled for a pittance.  
Instead, the client found its way to us.  The opposing lawyers were also 
admiralty lawyers.  Ken and I didn’t know a ship from a boat, let alone the 
meaning of the nineteenth century Inchmaree Clause in maritime insurance 
law, on which the case mostly turned.4  So what?  We drew optimism from our 
energy.  We took the case for a small retainer and a contingency.  Luckily, the 
trial was delayed and we had time to thoroughly learn admiralty law and line 
up our expert witnesses.  We won at trial and on appeal.5  With my share of the 
fee I was able to buy a condo while they were still cheap.  After three years, I 
was offered a teaching job at New York University School of Law and took it.  
That was 1978.  I’m still there. 
What does this brief history have to do with the theme of this symposium?  
Though it can sometimes seem otherwise, I know there are not as many ways 
to teach professional responsibility as there are teachers of it.  But there is 
 
 2. STEPHEN GILLERS, “I’D RATHER DO IT MYSELF:” HOW TO SET UP YOUR OWN LAW 
FIRM (1977). 
 3. Or so I thought and like to think.  Unfortunately, it is not always true. 
 4. The Inchmaree Clause takes its name from a ship that was the subject of litigation in the 
British courts in the 1880s.  The clause was drafted to overturn the result in that case.  It broadens 
the scope of maritime insurance coverage.  See Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Anderson Excavating & 
Wrecking Co., 189 F.3d 512, 519–20 (7th Cir. 1999); Thanh Long P’ship v. Highlands Ins. Co., 
32 F.3d 189, 191 (5th Cir. 1994); Antilles S.S. Co., Ltd. v. Members of Am. Hull Ins. Syndicate, 
733 F.2d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1984) (providing a brief history of the clause). 
 5. The case is Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Hersent Offshore, Inc., 567 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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probably a greater variety of approaches to this subject than any other standard 
course in the curriculum (except law and literature, which I also teach).  How 
it’s taught will depend on the experience of the instructor.  Of course, all of us 
who teach legal ethics deal with the ABA’s rules, confidentiality and privilege, 
conflicts, fiduciary duty, and other doctrines that define the work of lawyers.  
We critically analyze the law and rules we cover.  Whose interests do they 
favor?  Do they promote justice?  What is justice in this context?  (What is 
“this context” in this context?)  Is the rule fair and right?  Can it be improved?  
Who should decide?  We do all this, but we may differ in what we aim to 
accomplish, and we surely differ in our methods.  Those differences will be a 
product of many influences, not least of all experience in practice, or the lack 
of it. 
In 1978, when I started teaching, the ABA had recently adopted a rule 
requiring accredited law schools to offer instruction in the legal profession and 
legal ethics.6  I agreed to teach one section of the class.  I was neither eager nor 
unwilling to teach it.  Later in this essay I’ll say what I try to accomplish in the 
course and how, but first I want to say what I’ve learned about the subject’s 
reputation in American law schools because I think that is also important. 
Despite the ABA rule, some law schools, including some of the most 
prominent, either do not offer a class in legal ethics or offer only one 
occasional section with too few seats to accommodate all students.7  These 
schools purport to fulfill the ABA requirement in other ways, including 
pervasively, expecting that teachers of other courses will address ethical issues 
in their syllabi.  Surely, some do.  But despite the good work of Deborah 
Rhode to help teachers surface ethical issues throughout the curriculum,8 I 
suspect that many, probably most, teachers do not do it.  Some classes do not 
readily lend themselves to discussion of topics in lawyer regulation. Others do, 
but their teachers have primary (if not sole) allegiance to doctrines in their own 
field, for which they barely have enough time as it is.  And even if every 
teacher whose class could plausibly include issues of professional regulation 
 
 6. The rule now reads: “A law school shall require that each student receives substantial 
instruction in . . . the history, goals, structure, values, rules, and responsibilities of the legal 
profession and its members.”  SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, 
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS: RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS § 
302(a)(5) (2006). 
 7. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE PROFESSIONALISM COMMITTEE OF THE ABA SECTION OF 
LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING 
PROFESSIONALISM 40–41 (1996) (reporting on a 1994 survey of 131 law schools that found that 
44% offered a required two-credit class with the remainder providing other options both more and 
less demanding).  Eight schools had “no required ethics or professionalism courses.”  Id. at 41. 
Support for the statement in the text inevitably must also rely on personal knowledge gleaned 
from conversations with other law teachers. 
 8. See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE 
PERVASIVE METHOD (2d ed. 1998). 
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attempted to discuss one or two of them, there is no way to ensure that they 
won’t all address the same issues.  The upshot is that at some schools the ABA 
directive is seriously slighted. 
But most schools do require the class and today many faculty consider it 
their primary teaching and research subject.9  This is very gratifying.  In my 
time teaching, there has been an explosion in the number of academic articles 
written about the regulation of lawyers and judges—from all sources—not just 
through ethics rules.  Paralleling the academic interest is an increased interest 
in the legal profession generally, including in the courts, sparked in part by the 
very existence of the required legal ethics class in law schools (as time goes by 
more and more lawyers and judges will have taken the course), by the focus on 
the behavior of lawyers and law firms in the popular and legal press, by the 
nearly universal requirement of continuing legal education ethics credit, and by 
the highly visible (sometimes raucous) debates surrounding the adoption of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and amendments to it, state ethics 
rules, Sarbanes-Oxley and the ensuing SEC regulations, and the Restatement 
of Law Governing Lawyers.  All of this has made for a rich and gratifying 
soup. 
That’s the good news.  The bad news is that notwithstanding the academic 
and professional engagement, legal ethics, by whatever name, is the Cinderella 
of the law school curriculum.  It is mostly tolerated, rarely loved.  It’s not hard 
to see why.  Requiring all students to take the course carries a cost for the law 
school.  A school that admits 300 or more students yearly must offer at least 
three sections.  Even at two credits, that’s three full-time faculty members and 
600 contact hours yearly.  (This assumes the class is not outsourced to 
adjuncts, another form of benign neglect.)  Another shortcoming is that legal 
ethics is viewed as uncomfortably close to law practice, which means it is too 
far from theory.  Many law teachers see their institutions as graduate schools 
that happen to train professionals and only incidentally as professional schools 
that train practicing lawyers.  Practice is all right, of course, but it’s, well, 
practice; and practice is not theory.  Practicing lawyers rarely have the time or 
need to ask the big questions, the kind of questions that generations of law 
teachers spend their lives asking, answering, and then asking in new ways.  
Too much practice presumably weakens the capacity for theory just as sugar 
decays the teeth.  (A lawyer with my experience would have a nearly 
 
 9. In 1978, when I started teaching, the Directory of Law Teachers had about seven 
columns of teachers under the category Legal Profession.  By 1986, it had inched up to about 
eight columns.  The 2006–2007 edition of the book contains nearly sixteen columns under the 
category Professional Responsibility.  See ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, THE 
AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 2006–2007 (2006).  More dramatic, the number of 
teachers with over ten years in the category increased six fold between 1978–1979 and 2006–
2007, from two-thirds of a column to more than four columns.  This reflects both the entry of new 
teachers of the subject over this period and their decision to stay in it.  Id. 
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impossible time getting hired today, and I’m not so sure about the “nearly.”)  
Even if the material in the course were not viewed as too close to practice, it is 
not often seen as a subject in its own right, but rather as an amalgamation of 
doctrines pilfered from other subjects (e.g., agency, constitutional law, 
fiduciary duty, tort law).  A friend who volunteered to teach professional 
responsibility at his school told me that the trouble with the subject was that it 
had no theory. What could I say?  Certainly, it does not lend itself to broad 
pronouncements that can explain everything.10 
Dismissive faculty attitudes are not lost on students, who are rarely eager 
to take the class in any event.  Mostly it’s offered in the upper years, by which 
time in a student’s career the word “required” before the word “course” is 
ground for indictment and summary punishment, not gratitude.  Besides, 
students anticipate that the knowledge they gain in legal ethics—unlike 
excellence in (say) securities, or antitrust, or bankruptcy—is not the kind of 
information that will be attractive to employers.  It can’t be “resold” to clients.  
An “A” in corporations has palpable market value.  An “A” in professional 
responsibility?  Oh, that’s nice.  Explaining to students that they are learning 
rules and law that will govern their work lives for the next fifty years—
ignorance of which can lead to embarrassment, anxiety, monetary sanctions, 
loss of status, even professional death—doesn’t resonate.  In the cocoon of the 
academy, students may view the rules governing the profession as only 
remotely connected to the world they are about to enter.  Not true, of course, as 
they’ll soon discover.  Surely I’m not the only teacher of the subject delighted 
to learn that practicing lawyers are intellectually, even emotionally, invested in 
even the minor rules that govern how they may serve their clients. 
All this makes the class a real challenge to teach.  I’ve had good years, not 
so good years, and many in between.  It’s certainly easier to teach evidence, 
my other yearly course.  I don’t blame the material.  How could I?  Many 
issues in the class pervade popular culture, high and low.  Films, books, and 
television shows have long been fascinated with the moral ambiguities that 
define the professional role.  These issues also pop up—weekly it seems—in 
news stories about lawyers, law firms, and judges.  I don’t mean to say that my 
classes lack all excitement—I hope they don’t—only that it can be a challenge 
to persuade students to appreciate the intellectual and social importance that I 
think the subject deserves and which practicing lawyers intuitively grasp.  My 
dilemma may not confound others, who may be able to generate a level of 
classroom enthusiasm that eludes me.  If so, I hope they are contributing to this 
volume and will share their secrets. 
 
 10. This comment, in a tone both genial and dismissive, bothered me.  I was able to exorcise 
it only by writing a brief essay in self-defense.  See generally Stephen Gillers, Legal Ethics: Art 
or Theory?, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 49 (2001). 
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I could stop teaching it.  After all, approaching the home stretch of my 
academic career as I am, haven’t I earned the right to just have fun?  True, I’m 
publicly identified with the subject (and with little else), I get more than my 
share of press calls, and I have a casebook to keep up.11 
There is also the matter of institutional responsibility.  The school needs 
me to teach the class.  Furthermore, I like the subject.  I enjoy thinking and 
talking about it.  This is all surely reason enough to stay with it.  Indeed, the 
casebook alone is worth the price of admission.  Now in its seventh edition and 
twenty-second year, it has been on this earth nearly as long as my now adult 
daughters, to whom each edition is dedicated.  Working on the book, writing 
the problems, choosing and organizing the materials (making them as timely as 
possible), and getting the occasional e-mail from teachers who use the book 
(and even from some students) expressing appreciation for its content and 
“voice,” have been among the most fulfilling experiences of my professional 
life.  Although new editions are published only every three or four years, I 
update my files weekly.  The book, you might say, is a member of my 
extended family.  Of course, I could publish it whether or not I continued to 
teach the class, but I would not remain as close to the subject.  The book would 
suffer. 
There is yet another and independent reason to stick with legal ethics.  This 
is where the autobiography comes in most directly.  My practice experience 
tells me that it’s the most important class a law student can take.  Sure, sure.  I 
anticipate the objections: What about constitutional law?  What about 
corporations?  What about contracts?  And, anyway, nearly everyone thinks 
that his or her class is the most important.  True, but only one of us is right.  
My reason is simple.  Legal ethics is the only class in the law school 
curriculum whose content is relevant to the daily professional life of all 
graduates who practice law, which is nearly everyone. Bankruptcy is important 
to bankruptcy lawyers, but most lawyers do not need to know much, if any, 
bankruptcy law.  The same point can be made about criminal law and 
securities and civil procedure.  And so on.  But all lawyers “practice” legal 
ethics just by going to work. 
The common denominator does not stop there.  All lawyers also have 
clients, at least one, often hundreds or thousands across a career.  Indirectly, 
the class is for clients too.  Or to put it another way: How can a law school 
conscientiously certify graduates as competent professionals without making 
an earnest effort to ensure that they understand the responsibilities of their 
profession to clients?  And the class is for the courts, adversaries, and the 
public as well, because every law graduate who practices law has obligations 
to each group.  There’s more.  Many students will go on to run government law 
 
 11. STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS (7th ed. 
2005). 
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offices, corporate law departments, private law firms, and public interest 
organizations.  In these roles and others, they will make choices that define the 
culture of their offices.  Some students will be active in bar associations or 
become judges.  In these roles, they will influence or decide the content of 
rules governing the profession.  In short, no other law school subject will have 
as much importance across the population of each graduating class. 
Now that I’ve persuaded you that legal ethics is the most important law 
school class, let me say something about how I try to teach it.  This perspective 
also informs the content of my casebook and is inescapably a product of nearly 
a decade in practice with a broad range of clients and legal problems.  I 
approach professional responsibility issues from the bottom up.  Every client, 
every case, every matter is a story.  Concepts don’t hire lawyers.  People with 
problems do.  The people rarely want to be there.  Even in the best of 
circumstances (buying a home? adoption?) getting involved with the law and 
lawyers is intimidating.  And of course for many clients, the circumstances are 
not the best and the experience is terrifying.  Their income, wealth, freedom, 
relationships, or reputation may be at stake.  This is so whether the person with 
whom the lawyer must deal is the actual client or an officer of an 
organizational client.  Worse, the system in which they’re enmeshed is 
generally foreign to them.  They may know only its caricature in popular 
culture.  In their role as clients, their lawyer is the most important person in 
their life. 
So in class, I start by focusing on the facts, the client, the client’s problem, 
the lawyer’s problem, whether these appear in an actual case, in the somewhat 
factually complex problems I try to write, a film clip, or a legal ethics video.  I 
can’t offer students an actual client—an experience they’ll have soon enough 
and which will do more than any classroom discussion ever could to 
concentrate their awareness of the professional role and the relevance of the 
rules they study.  Realizing, as a lawyer, that you have an ethical dilemma, that 
you have to make a choice about how to act, that your client may suffer unduly 
if you choose wrong, that you may also pay a professional price or expose 
yourself and your colleagues to liability if you err—well, that’s when you may 
appreciate, albeit retrospectively, why the class should be required.  If only we 
could reproduce that environment in class.  But we can’t.  In class, the material 
has to remain abstract.  Still, there are degrees of abstraction and we can try for 
as much immediacy and verisimilitude as the artificiality of the classroom 
allows. 
I begin with the story of the case or hypothetical, but I don’t end there. A 
bottom up approach implies both a bottom and an up.  Students may have 
intuitive reactions to the issues that the cases and problems posed, and those 
should be identified, nurtured, and discussed. Despite the legal academy’s low 
regard for feelings (along with practice), the truth is that intuition offers 
valuable information, especially for this subject.  Intuition may not be enough 
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to support a conclusion, but it has pedagogical value.  We must next compare 
our intuition with the requirements of the rules and case holdings (positive 
law).  We must then critique positive law, especially where it diverges from 
our intuition.  That critique will take us into greater abstraction as we attempt 
to identify and defend governing principles for the problem at hand (we’re 
finally getting close to theory here) and then see where else these principles 
may lead. 
Earlier, I wrote that in my risk-ignoring, highly optimistic dive into solo 
Manhattan practice only four years out of law school, I told myself that hard 
work and concern and respect for clients would ensure success.  I can’t teach 
hard work, but I do make it a point to emphasize the importance of treating 
clients with concern and respect.  Far too often, lawyers don’t do that. (Oh, I 
could tell you stories!)  I ask students to put themselves in the role of a medical 
patient and appreciate the dependency of the relationship and the need for 
communication.  The more serious the problem, the greater the patient’s 
anxiety, and therefore the need to be able to reach the doctor and to feel secure 
in his or her concern.  I emphasize that a lawyer does not have to like a client 
as a person—some clients are really awful people—but having assumed the 
work, a lawyer must be professionally devoted to the client as a client.  If you 
can’t do that, step aside. 
“Eat your spinach,” is the perennial parental injunction.  “You may not like 
the taste, but it’s good for you. You’ll thank me later.”  Is that what I sound 
like?  Have I made legal ethics the spinach of the law school curriculum?  
Unappetizing but required?  I hope not.  I strive, as we all do, to make the meal 
as satisfying as possible.  I fiddle with the recipe and play with the 
presentation.  But if it doesn’t quite work, if the dish will never be as tempting 
as Title VII Tiramisu or First Amendment Profiterole, what can I say except 
“Eat your spinach?”  Experience tells me students need this.  It’s good for 
them.  They’ll thank me later.  I hope. 
 
